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THE SCOPE OF EXECUTIVE POWER IN THE TWENTYFIRST CENTURY: AN INTRODUCTION
ROBERT D. SLOANE*

The scope of the executive power, the topic of the present panel, embraces a
number of conceptually distinct questions. In the first place, we must
distinguish issues of source (from where does the President derive a particular
power?) from those of scope (in what does that power, properly construed,
consist, and how far does it extend?). What, for example, does the Vesting
Clause,1 assuming it constitutes an independent source of presidential power,
vest? Also, does the scope of the executive power expand and contract, as
Justice Jackson famously suggested,2 based on its arguable overlap with
powers vested in Congress or on the latter’s express or implied will? Many
argue – and experience and precedent attest – that the scope of the executive
power expands during times of perceived crisis.3 But if so, who may decide
what constitutes a crisis, as well as when it begins and ends? In particular, is
this a political question, or do standards of law play some role? To cite a
timely example, is it a question of law whether the “Global War on Terror” is a
“war” in the constitutional sense,4 which activates certain executive powers of
the President under the Commander in Chief Clause?5
Finally, we should distinguish descriptive questions (what is the scope of the
executive power?) from normative ones (what should it be?) – although some
would argue that the possibility of a non-normative theory of constitutional
interpretation is a fiction.6 On the normative side, further questions inevitably
*
Associate Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law. This is a revised
version of introductory remarks to a panel entitled “The Scope of Executive Power” held on
October 12, 2007, at Boston University School of Law’s symposium The Role of the
President in the 21st Century.
1 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
2 See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
3 See Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks, War Everywhere: Rights, National Security Law, and the
Law of Armed Conflict in the Age of Terror, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 675, 695-702 (2004).
4 See LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 98-99
(Oxford University Press 2d ed. 1996); see also Campbell v. Clinton, 203 F.3d 19, 37-39
(D.C. Cir. 2000) (Tatel, J., concurring) (discussing the competency and constitutionality of
courts determining the existence of a war).
5 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
6 See, e.g., S OTIRIOS A. BARBER & JAMES E. FLEMING, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION:
THE BASIC QUESTIONS, at xiii (2007); RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW: THE MORAL
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arise: if, for example, the scope of the executive power is, in the President’s
view, inadequate to address a particular crisis, should he exceed it – as
President Lincoln avowedly, though transparently and temporarily, did during
the Civil War?7 And if a state of genuine necessity seems to require the
President to exceed the scope of his constitutional powers, an idea captured
(again by Justice Jackson) in the oft-cited maxim that the Constitution is not a
“suicide pact,”8 should that be done secretly, or publicly in the sort of political
order our Constitution enacts?9
None of these questions is academic in the pejorative sense. Indeed, a panel
on the scope of the executive power could hardly be more timely. Countless
articles, both in the popular press and law reviews,10 and several recent
books,11 suggest that a unifying theme of Bush administration policy and
ideology has been its effort to aggrandize – or restore,12 depending on one’s
view – the scope of the President’s constitutional executive powers relative to
the other branches of the federal government. Charlie Savage, among others,
argues that the administration, animated in large part by an ideological
conviction formed by Vice President Richard B. Cheney decades before the
READING OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 7-12 (1996). Compare Gary Lawson, On
Reading Recipes . . . and Constitutions, 85 GEO. L.J. 1823 (1997) (arguing that constitutional
scholars must distinguish theories of interpretation – questions about the Constitution’s
meaning – from political theories about its legitimacy or normative force), with Michael C.
Dorf, Recipe for Trouble: Some Thoughts on Meaning, Translation and Normative Theory,
85 GEO. L.J. 1857, 1858 (1997) (“Whether we equate meaning with original public meaning,
or with speaker’s meaning, or with a dynamic conception of meaning, or with something
else, depends on why we care about the meaning of whatever it is we are interpreting.”).
7 See Derek Jinks & David Sloss, Is the President Bound by the Geneva Conventions?,
90 CORNELL L. REV. 97, 148 (2004). In a speech made to Congress after his extraconstitutional conduct, Lincoln famously asked: “[A]re all the laws, but one, to go
unexecuted, and the government itself go to pieces, lest that one be violated?” Abraham
Lincoln, Message to Congress in Special Session (July 4, 1861), in 4 THE COLLECTED
WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 421, 430 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953).
8 Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 37 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
9 See JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY: LAW AND JUDGMENT INSIDE THE BUSH
ADMINISTRATION 81 (2007) (expressing the view that executive disregard of the law, while
necessary at times and hardly without precedent, should be done publicly so that “Congress
and the people [may] decide whether the emergency was severe enough to warrant
extralegal action”).
10 See, e.g., Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks, We the People’s Executive, 115 YALE L.J. POCKET
PART 88, 88 (2006) (“Over the past few years, President George W. Bush and his chief
advisors have claimed a range of powers that would have turned Britain’s King George III
green with envy.”).
11 See, e.g., GOLDSMITH, supra note 9; CHARLIE SAVAGE, TAKEOVER: THE RETURN OF THE
IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY AND THE SUBVERSION OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2007); FREDERICK
A.O. SCHWARZ, JR. & AZIZ Z. HUQ, UNCHECKED AND UNBALANCED: PRESIDENTIAL POWER IN
A TIME OF TERROR (2007).
12 See GOLDSMITH, supra note 9, at 89.
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tragic events of September 11, 2001,13 has consistently sought to increase the
powers of the executive to a level equal to, if not exceeding, those famously
described in 1973 – at the apex of the Nixon administration – as “imperial.”14
What, in particular, lends credence to this allegation? The answer is both
abstract and concrete, for “[i]t is only a very vulgar historical materialism that
denies the power of ideas.”15
At an abstract or theoretical level, according to Savage and others, the
Unitary Executive theory of the presidency,16 which constitutional scholars and
historians debated fiercely in the 1990s (and continue to debate),17 has been
adapted and merged by the Bush administration with a new “Unitary
Executive” theory, which differs profoundly from its namesake.18 This new
theory, unlike the original one, does not refer principally to a particular
(stringent) conception of the separation of powers established by the
Constitution and to powers derived from the original meaning of the executive
power vested in the President. Rather, it refers to a broad (many would say
exorbitant) scope of purportedly inherent executive power, the pedigree of
13 See id. at 85-90; SAVAGE, supra note 11, at 8-9, 69 (asserting that Cheney’s view “had
been cultivating for nearly thirty years, and would be a guiding principle from the first day
he and Bush took office”); SCHWARZ & HUQ, supra note 11, at 154-55.
14 ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY (1973); see also GOLDSMITH,
supra note 9, at 183 (“The presidency in the age of terrorism – the Terror Presidency –
suffers from many of the vices of Schlesinger’s Imperial Presidency.”).
15 ISAIAH BERLIN, Two Concepts of Liberty, in LIBERTY 166, 167 (Henry Hardy ed.,
2002).
16 The Unitary Executive theory draws its name from a passage in The Federalist No. 70,
in which Alexander Hamilton defended the need for a vigorous, energetic, and therefore
unified executive. THE FEDERALIST NO. 70, at 471, 471-72 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E.
Cooke ed., 1961). The theory’s first sustained defense, according to Savage, is to be found
in an executive memorandum entitled “Separation of Powers: Legislative-Executive
Relations,” dated April 30, 1986, which former Attorney General Edwin Meese
commissioned during the Reagan administration. SAVAGE, supra note 11, at 47-48.
17 The locus classicus of this debate is the argument of Lawrence Lessig & Cass R.
Sunstein in The President and the Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1994), and the
response of Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash in The President’s Power to
Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541 (1994). Recent contributions include Curtis A.
Bradley & Martin S. Flaherty, Executive Power Essentialism and Foreign Affairs, 102
MICH. L. REV. 545, 554 (2004) and Steven G. Calabresi & Gary Lawson, The Unitary
Executive, Jurisdiction Stripping, and the Hamdan Opinions: A Textualist Response to
Justice Scalia, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1002, 1006 (2007).
18 See SAVAGE, supra note 11, at 122-24 (describing how the Bush administration
merged its theory that the President has vast “inherent” powers that do not appear in the
Constitution or federal law with its expanded view of the original Unitary Executive theory
to conclude that the “president could do virtually anything, without any check by
Congress”); see also GOLDSMITH, supra note 9, at 85 (stressing the “newer and more
aggressive incarnation” of the Unitary Executive theory invoked by the Bush
administration); SCHWARZ & HUQ, supra note 11, at 157.
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which is frequently unclear. Therefore, despite their nominal overlap, the
implications and consequences of these two theories differ significantly.19
Their combination has culminated in a view of the scope of the executive
power that is unprecedented in its breadth.20
The Unitary Executive theory, as initially formulated and understood, posits
that the Constitution textually vests the executive power, which must be
understood as a substantive grant of power, in a single individual: the
President.21 He or she perforce enjoys exclusive and plenary power over all
subordinate agencies and officials, provided they are properly understood as
part of the executive branch. The executive power of the President therefore
includes the authority to modify decisions issued by administrative agencies
and to exercise total control over subordinate executive officials, unconstrained
by statutes purporting to limit or condition presidential powers vested by the
Constitution in a single, unitary executive. The Constitution therefore forbids,
for example, independent administrative agencies,22 or those provisions of the
Ethics in Government Act of 1978, as amended,23 which had authorized
independent counsels – independent in the sense that the President lacked
exclusive and plenary control over them – to investigate allegations of
executive branch malfeasance.24 Equally, to cite a more timely example, if the
power to conduct foreign intelligence surveillance falls within the purview of
the executive power, properly construed, then the Foreign Intelligence

19

But see SCHWARZ & HUQ, supra note 11, at 157 (arguing that the two views share
historical, methodological, and intellectual commonalities).
20 See, e.g., SAVAGE, supra note 11, at 124.
21 For a concise statement of the position, see Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes,
The Structural Constitution: Unitary Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1153,
1165-68 (1992) (“[Unitary Executive theorists] conclude that the President alone possesses
all of the executive power and that he therefore can direct, control, and supervise inferior
officers or agencies who seek to exercise discretionary executive power.” (footnote
omitted)) and Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, The Jeffersonian Treaty Clause, 2006 U. ILL.
L. REV. 1, 22-43 (defending against a variety of critiques the view that the Vesting Clause is
a substantive grant of executive power).
22 Contra Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 628-29 (1935) (stating that
Congress has the authority to create administrative bodies, the officials of which are free
from the President’s power of removal).
23 See Ethics in Government Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-521, 92 Stat. 1824 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C., 5 U.S.C., and 28 U.S.C.).
24 See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 697-734 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting). The
independent counsel statute, which had been reenacted, in amended form, in 1982, 1987,
and 1994, expired on June 30, 1999. See 28 U.S.C. § 599 (2000).
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Surveillance Act (“FISA”)25 unconstitutionally (and ineffectively) purports to
regulate an authority vested exclusively in the President.26
The more recent manifestation of what has also been described – although
almost certainly misleadingly – as the Unitary Executive theory is quite
different. Indeed, many proponents of the original Unitary Executive theory
explicitly disavow the suggestion that it implies a broad scope of residual,
unenumerated, or inherent executive powers beyond those either specified in
the Constitution’s text or historically derived from the original meaning of the
executive power.27 Schwarz and Huq refer to this new theory as that of a
“monarchical executive.”28 Associated with John C. Yoo’s scholarship,29 the
new theory also emerges, implicitly and sometimes explicitly, in the
controversial Office of Legal Counsel (“OLC”) memoranda produced by John
Yoo, David Addington, Alberto R. Gonzales, and other key attorneys involved
in the formulation of Bush administration policies, particularly those germane
to the “Global War on Terror.”30 On this view, Savage writes:
[T]he president, as head of the executive branch and the commander in
chief of the armed forces, has vast “inherent” powers that are not spelled
out in the Constitution or federal law. Especially in matters of national
security, these unlisted powers provide for an enormous potential scope

25 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783 (1978)
(codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1871 (2000 & Supp. IV 2004)).
26 See Gary Lawson, What Lurks Beneath: NSA Surveillance and Executive Power, 88
B.U. L. REV. 375, 390 n.94, 391-93 (2008).
27 See, e.g., Saikrishna B. Prakash & Michael D. Ramsey, Foreign Affairs and the
Jeffersonian Executive: A Defense, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1591, 1601-06 (2005); see also
Christopher S. Yoo, Steven G. Calabresi, & Anthony J. Colangelo, The Unitary Executive in
the Modern Era, 1945-2004, 90 IOWA L. REV. 601, 729-30 (2005).
28 SCHWARZ & HUQ, supra note 11, at 157.
29 E.g., JOHN YOO, THE POWERS OF WAR AND PEACE: THE CONSTITUTION AND FOREIGN
AFFAIRS AFTER 9/11, at 18-19 (2005); John C. Yoo, The Continuation of Politics by Other
Means: The Original Understanding of War Powers, 84 CAL. L. REV. 167, 174 (1996) (“A
war may be constitutional, even if no declaration of war has issued or if the President acted
unilaterally, so long as one branch has not usurped the textually enumerated power of
another.”); see GOLDSMITH, supra note 9, at 97 (“[Yoo] believed that when the Constitution
vested ‘the executive power’ in the President, it gave him all of the military powers
possessed by the King of England save those expressly given to Congress.”); SCHWARZ &
HUQ, supra note 11, at 163.
30 E.g., Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney Gen., to Alberto R.
Gonzales, Counsel to the President, Standards of Conduct for Interrogation Under 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2340-2340A (Aug. 1, 2002), reprinted in THE TORTURE PAPERS 172 (Karen J. Greenberg
& Joshua L. Dratel eds., 2005) [hereinafter Bybee Memorandum].
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of action. The government can do virtually anything the president
believes is necessary to defend the country.31
Similarly, Jack Goldsmith, who served as head of the OLC for a nine-month
period between 2003 and 2004, describes Addington’s belief “that presidential
power [i]s coextensive with presidential responsibility.”32
The extent to which this idea has filtered into mainstream legal culture in the
post-9/11 world may be evident in, for example, Judge Michael B. Mukasey’s
response during his Attorney General confirmation hearings in October 2007
when asked by Senator Patrick Leahy whether the President must obey federal
statutes: “That would have to depend,” he said, “on whether what goes outside
the statute nonetheless lies within the authority of the president to defend the
country.”33 Again, the idea of an inherent executive authority to take whatever
action the President deems necessary to defend the country, even if that action
violates a valid federal statute, is quite distinct from the original Unitary
Executive theory, which holds, more modestly, that some statutes purporting to
constrain the scope of executive authority should not be deemed valid in the
first place because they infringe on plenary, exclusive powers vested in the
President by the executive power, properly construed. The new Unitary (or
monarchical) Executive theory is redolent of President Nixon’s infamous
remark that “‘when the President does it, that means that it is not illegal.’”34
Goldsmith recounts that Addington, for example, expressed exasperation at the
idea “‘that the Constitution doesn’t empower the President to do what he
thinks is necessary to prevent an attack’” even if the contemplated conduct
would violate valid congressional restrictions.35
In short, Savage and others argue that the Bush administration forged a
breathtakingly robust view of the scope of executive power by combining the
original Unitary Executive thesis, which insists on the exclusivity of certain
plenary presidential powers (that is, on powers beyond the constitutional
authority of Congress to regulate) with a vastly expanded “monarchical” vision
of the inherent scope of those powers (that is, on powers that inhere in the
President’s role under the Constitution despite the absence of an express
textual basis).36

31 SAVAGE, supra note 11, at 123; see also GOLDSMITH, supra note 9, at 82 (recounting
that Addington frequently argued that “the Constitution empowers the President to exercise
prerogative powers to do what is necessary in an emergency to save the country”).
32 GOLDSMITH, supra note 9, at 79.
33 Jed Rubenfeld, Lawbreaker in Chief, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2007, at A29.
34 Jinks & Sloss, supra note 7, at 149 (quoting Interview by David Frost with President
Richard Nixon (May 19, 1977)); id. (elaborating that “Nixon claimed that if the President
determines that a specified action is necessary to protect national security, then the action is
lawful, even if it is prohibited by a federal statute”).
35 GOLDSMITH, supra note 9, at 78-79 (quoting David Addington).
36 SAVAGE, supra note 11, at 124; SCHWARZ & HUQ, supra note 11, at 161.
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At a more concrete level, controversy over the scope of the executive power
has been perhaps the paramount theme unifying headline political
controversies of the past seven years. To cite a few well-known examples: (1)
the frequent use of robust executive privilege claims to shield from scrutiny
controversial executive conduct, such as the practice of extraordinary
rendition,37 or the activities of the national energy task force chaired by Vice
President Cheney;38 (2) the contention that the President may disregard,
redefine, or marginalize treaty obligations such as those defining U.S.
obligations under the Geneva Conventions and prohibiting torture and cruel,
inhumane, or degrading treatment;39 (3) the assertion of authority to detain
individuals, including U.S. citizens and lawful, permanent-resident aliens,
without charge or access to an attorney, based on the President’s unilateral and
unreviewable classification of them as unlawful enemy combatants;40 (4) the
creation and design by executive order of military commissions for the trial of
foreign detainees in the “Global War on Terror”;41 and (5) the warrantless
wiretapping of U.S. citizens in apparent violation of FISA.42
Now, in citing these examples from the Bush administration, it should be
stressed that, historically, the struggle over the proper scope and limits of the
executive power is neither a new issue nor a partisan one. For most of our
constitutional history, Presidents of all political parties have almost invariably
sought to increase the scope of the executive power while they held office.43

37 See El-Masri v. Tenet, 437 F. Supp. 2d 530, 539 (E.D. Va. 2006), aff’d, 479 F.3d 296
(4th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 373 (2007); Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 2d 250,
254-55 (E.D.N.Y. 2006). See generally Margaret L. Satterthwaite, Rendered Meaningless:
Extraordinary Rendition and the Rule of Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1333 (2007).
38 See, e.g., In re Cheney, 334 F.3d 1096, 1107 (D.C. Cir. 2003), vacated and remanded,
Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court for Dist. of Columbia, 542 U.S. 367, 392 (2004), on remand 406
F.3d 723 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
39 See, e.g., Memorandum from Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, to George
W. Bush, President of the United States, Decision Re Application of the Geneva
Conventions on Prisoners of War to the Conflict with Al-Qaeda and the Taliban (Jan. 25,
2002), reprinted in THE TORTURE PAPERS, supra note 30, at 118; see also Bybee
Memorandum, supra note 30, at 172.
40 See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 539-40 (2004) (Souter, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part, and concurring in the judgment); Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 43032 (2004); Al-Marri v. Wright, 487 F.3d 160, 163-64 (4th Cir. 2007).
41 See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2760 (2006).
42 See ACLU v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, 438 F. Supp. 2d 754 (E.D. Mich. 2006), rev’d and
remanded, 493 F.3d 644, 648-49 (6th Cir. 2007). But see Lawson, supra note 26, at 391-93
(arguing that the President may enjoy the constitutional authority under the Vesting Clause
to monitor communications during wartime and that this authority, if it exists, cannot be
regulated by Congress).
43 Presidents of both contemporary political parties, including, for example, Abraham
Lincoln, Theodore Roosevelt, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Harry S. Truman, Richard M.
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In fact, in a sense this debate precedes the Constitution – and, of course, also
profoundly shaped it. The debate did not begin with the administration of
George W. Bush, the forty-third President of the United States, but with the
colonial administration of George William Frederick (King George III) of
Great Britain. The Declaration of Independence is substantially comprised of a
litany of grievances against what its drafters and many Americans at the time
saw as the exercise by King George III of an unduly broad, indeed tyrannical,
scope of executive power.44 The Articles of Confederation, in part for that
reason, deliberately did not create a national executive at all. While this
proved, as we know, unworkable, the fear of a tyrannical executive persisted in
the minds of the Framers.45 Since the Constitution’s ratification in 1789,
questions about the proper scope of the executive power have proved a
persistent and recurrent theme of our constitutional narrative.
One of the first constitutional controversies, for example, which broke out
almost immediately after the Constitution’s enactment, involved issues about
the scope of the executive power and congressional power to restrict it by
treaty or statute. Before independence, the United States had entered into
treaties of alliance with France.46 Shortly after independence, France,
emerging from its own revolution, declared war on, among others, Great
Britain and Holland.47 The United States, anxious to avoid war and fearful that
France would invoke U.S. treaty obligations, sought to preserve its neutrality.
So on April 22, 1793, President George Washington issued a proclamation of
neutrality, which – though studiously avoiding the actual word neutrality –
purported to require the United States to “adopt and pursue a conduct friendly
and impartial toward the belligerent Powers.”48 This led to a famous debate
over the executive power between Alexander Hamilton, writing under the
pseudonym Pacificus, and James Madison, writing under the pseudonym
Helvidius. The former contended that the power to declare neutrality rested in
the President’s discretion.49 The latter inferred from the congressional power
to declare war, as well as other enumerated powers and structural features of
the Constitution, a cognate power to declare neutrality, and he insisted on the

Nixon, Ronald Reagan, and William Jefferson Clinton have sought to aggrandize the scope
of executive power while in office. See SAVAGE, supra note 11, at 63.
44 See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
45 See HENKIN, supra note 4, at 27-28.
46 William R. Casto, Pacificus and Helvidius Reconsidered, 28 N. KY. L. REV. 612, 614
(2001).
47 See Morton J. Frisch, Introduction to THE PACIFICUS-HELVIDIUS DEBATES OF 17931794, at vii (Morton J. Frisch ed., 2007).
48 President George Washington, Washington’s Neutrality Proclamation, Apr. 22, 1793,
in THE PACIFICUS-HELVIDIUS DEBATES OF 1793-1794, supra note 47, at 1, 1.
49 See, e.g., Alexander Hamilton, Pacificus Number 1, in THE PACIFICUS-HELVIDIUS
DEBATES OF 1793-1794, supra note 47, at 8, 8-9.
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authority of treaties as “the supreme law of the land.”50 In language often cited
by those who caution against claims of exorbitant executive power in the
contemporary context of the “Global War on Terror,” Madison stressed that
“[t]hose who are to conduct a war cannot in the nature of things, be proper or
safe judges, whether a war ought to be commenced, continued, or
concluded.”51
There is a great deal more constitutional history that arguably bears on the
scope of the executive power in the twenty-first century. But it is vital to
appreciate that the scope of the executive power, particularly in the twenty-first
century, is not only a constitutional or historical issue. As an international
lawyer rather than a constitutionalist, I want to stress briefly that these debates
and their concrete manifestations in U.S. law and policy potentially exert a
profound effect on the shape of international law. Justice Sutherland’s
sweeping dicta in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., that the
President enjoys a “very delicate, plenary and exclusive power . . . as the sole
organ of the federal government in the field of international relations – a power
which does not require as a basis for its exercise an act of Congress,”52 has
been (correctly, in my view) criticized on a host of grounds.53 But in practice,
in part for institutional and structural reasons,54 it accurately reflects the
general preeminence of the President in the realm of U.S. foreign affairs.
Because of the nature of the international legal and political system, what
U.S. Presidents do and say often establish precedents that strongly influence
what other states do and say – with potentially dramatic consequences for the
shape of customary international law. The paradigmatic example is the
establishment of customary international law on the continental shelf following
the Truman Proclamation of September 28, 1945,55 which produced an echo of
similar claims and counterclaims, culminating in a whole new corpus of the
international law of the sea for what had previously been understood only as a
geological term of art.56
Many states took note, for example, when in the 2002 National Security
Strategy of the United States (“NSS”), President Bush asserted that the United
States had the right under international law to engage in preventive wars of

50

See, e.g., James Madison, Helvidius Number 1, in THE PACIFICUS-HELVIDIUS DEBATES
note 47, at 55, 61 (citing U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2).
51 Id. at 62.
52 United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936).
53 See generally HENKIN, supra note 4, at 19-20.
54 See Harold Hongju Koh, Why the President (Almost) Always Wins in Foreign Affairs:
Lessons of the Iran-Contra Affair, 97 YALE L.J. 1255, 1258 (1988).
55 Proclamation No. 2667, 10 Fed. Reg. 12,303 (Oct. 2, 1945).
56 See Bernard H. Oxman, The Territorial Temptation: A Siren Song at Sea, 100 AM. J.
INT’L L. 830, 832 (2006); Edward T. Swaine, Rational Custom, 52 DUKE L.J. 559, 608-12
(2002) (explicating the emergence of custom on the continental shelf in game theoretic
terms).
OF 1793-1794, supra
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self-defense.57 While, contrary to popular belief, the United States never in
fact formally relied on that doctrine in practice, many would argue that
President Bush de facto exercised this purported right when he initiated an
armed conflict with Iraq based on claims, which have since proved unfounded,
about its incipient programs to develop catastrophic weapons. The 2006 NSS
notably retreats from the 2002 NSS’s robust claims of a right to engage in
preventive wars of self-defense.58 Yet even within this brief, four-year period,
an astonishing number of other states have asserted a comparable right to
engage in preventive self-defense. These include not only states that the
United States has described as “rogue states,” such as North Korea and Iran,
but Australia, Japan, the United Kingdom, China, India, Iran, Israel, Russia,
and (though technically not a state) Taiwan.59 I doubt we will welcome the
consequences of this pattern for the evolving jus ad bellum of the twenty-first
century.
Equally, after President Bush’s decision to declare a global war on terror or
terrorism – rather than, for example, the Taliban, al-Qaeda, and their
immediate allies – virtually every insurgency or disaffected minority around
the world, including peoples suffering under repressive regimes and seeking to
assert legitimate rights to liberty and self-determination, has been
recharacterized by opportunistic state elites as part of the enemy in this global
war.60 The techniques employed and justified by the United States, including
the resurrection of rationalized torture as an “enhanced interrogation
technique,”61 likewise have emerged – and will continue to emerge – in the

57 THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES 6 (2002), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf (stating that the United States “will not hesitate to
act alone, if necessary, to exercise our right of self-defense by acting preemptively against
such terrorists, to prevent them from doing harm against our people and our country”).
58 See W. Michael Reisman & Andrea Armstrong, The Past and Future of the Claim of
Preemptive Self-Defense, 100 AM. J. INT’L L. 525, 531-32 (2006).
59 See id. at 538-46.
60 See LAWYERS COMM. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, ASSESSING THE NEW NORMAL: LIBERTY AND
SECURITY FOR THE POST-SEPTEMBER 11 UNITED STATES 73-80 (2003) (detailing how human
rights have been affected by countries that have imitated and expanded upon the United
States’s post-9/11 actions, for example, with respect to detainment of individuals and
treatment of political dissidents).
61 Torture itself remains widely practiced despite its prohibition by customary and
conventional international law. But few, if any, states claimed the right to torture before the
attacks of September 11, 2001. See, e.g., Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 884 & n.15
(2d Cir. 1980). I do not think it is either helpful or accurate to use euphemisms like
“enhanced interrogation techniques.” Those who quibble about the level of severe pain and
suffering that must be deliberately inflicted on a person for a particular act to qualify as
torture rather than “merely” cruel, inhumane, or degrading treatment, as do the authors of
the Bybee Memorandum, inhibit rather than promote candid debate and obfuscate the moral
and legal issues that torture raises. See Jeremy Waldron, Torture and Positive Law:
Jurisprudence for the White House, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1681, 1695-1709 (2005).
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practice of other states. Because of customary international law’s acute
sensitivity to authoritative assertions of power, the widespread repetition of
claims and practices initiated by the U.S. executive may well shape
international law in ways the United States ultimately finds disagreeable in the
future.
So as we debate the scope of the executive power in the twenty-first century,
the stakes, as several panelists point out, could not be higher. They include
more than national issues such as the potential for executive branch officials to
be prosecuted or impeached for exceeding the legal scope of their authority or
violating valid statutes.62 They also include international issues like the
potential use of catastrophic weapons by a rogue regime asserting a right to
engage in preventive war; the deterioration of international human rights
norms against practices like torture, norms which took years to establish; and
the atrophy of genuine U.S. power in the international arena, which, as
diplomats, statesmen, and international relations theorists of all political
persuasions appreciate, demands far more than the largest and most
technologically advanced military arsenal.
In short, what Presidents do, internationally as well as domestically – the
precedents they establish – may affect not only the technical scope of the
executive power, as a matter of constitutional law, but the practical ability of
future Presidents to exercise that power both at home and abroad. We should
candidly debate whether terrorism or other perceived crises require an
expanded scope of executive power in the twenty-first century. But it is
dangerous to cloak the true stakes of that debate with the expedient of a new –
and, in the view of most, indefensible – “monarchical executive” theory, which
claims to be coextensive with the defensible, if controversial, original Unitary
Executive theory.63 We should also weigh the costs and benefits of an
expanded scope of executive power. But it is vital to appreciate that there are
costs. They include not only short-term, acute consequences but long-term,
systemic consequences that may not become fully apparent for years. In fact,
the exorbitant exercise of broad, supposedly inherent, executive powers may
well – as in the aftermath of the Nixon administration – culminate in precisely
the sort of reactive statutory constraints and de facto diplomatic obstacles that
proponents of a robust executive regard as misguided and a threat to U.S.
national security in the twenty-first century.
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See GOLDSMITH, supra note 9, at 97; SCHWARZ & HUQ, supra note 11, at 157 (“The
Reagan-era vision of a unitary executive is distinct and different from the much more
sweeping claims of unchecked presidential power after 9/11. Unlike the monarchical vision
put forward after September 2001, the ‘unitary executive’ thesis rested on at least defensible
readings of the Constitution.”).
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